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R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1980 
{A· Second Opi nion} 
In this review I will discuss an 
aspect of Frey's book not considered 
in Edward Johnson's review (E&A 
11/1) or in the dialogue it prompted 
(Frey's reply E&A 11/4; Johnson's 
reply E&A 111/1). This aspect, which 
is presented primarily in Frey's final 
chapter, is whether the capacity to 
feel pain is a necessary condition for 
having interests. Frey's primary tar­
get in this regard is Peter Singer, 
who in Animal Liberation holds that 
animals' interests arise from their 
capacity to feel pain, and that this 
capacity is a prerequisite for having 
any interests at all. Frey, of cou rse, 
does not deny animals' capacity to feel 
pain; rather, he argues that this 
capacity is not a prerequisite for hav­
ing interests. 
The capacity to feel pain, Frey 
alleges, is not necessary for having 
interests because individuals can have 
interests and lack this capacity. Frey 
cites four examples: (1) his friend, 
who receiVed severe and extensive 
head, spinal and nervous injuries and 
is conscious although unable to feel 
pain; (2) Karen Quinlan, who is 
comatose; (3) human fetuses; and (4) 
unconceived persons. Among the 
interests Frey suggests these subjects 
have are, in the case of his inju red 
friend, an interest in the care of him­
self and his family; in the case of 
Karen Quinlan, an interest in her care 
and her privacy; and, in the case of 
human fetuses and unconceived per­
sons, an interest in the present gen­
eration's not polluting the environment 
or indiscriminately using up natural 
resources. In addition, fetuses and 
unconceived persons may have inter­
ests as the beneficia ries of trust 
funds, and fetuses have an interest in 
nourishment. 
Frey has shown, believe, by 
these examples, that the capacity 
presently to feel physical pain is not 
a necessary condition for having 
interests. This, however, is an 
excessively narrow understanding of 
"pain", since mental as well as physi­
cal discomfort can .constitute pain, and 
potential future pain should be taken 
into account. I submit that, although 
the capacity presently to feel physical 
pain is not a necessary condition for 
having interests, a case may be made 
that the capacity to experience mental 
or physical suffering, in the present 
or the future, is a prerequisite to 
having interests. For conven ience, I 
will refer to th is expanded under­
standing of the capacity to experience 
pain as the capacity to suffer. 
Frey's injured friend has this 
capacity; he may experience mental 
distress, for example, if he or his 
family is not cared for. Fetuses and 
unconceived persons also have this 
capacity; they will be affected in the 
future (when and if they are born) if 
the present generation excessively 
pollutes the earth or uses up its nat­
ural resources. Thus, without 
asserting an interest in being born on 
behalf of either fetuses or uncon­
ceived persons, we can speak mean­
ingfully of their having interests. 
Frey's fourth subject who cannot 
feel pain, Karen Quinlan, I assume for 
the sake of argument to be totally and 
permanently unable to experience any 
physical or mental discomfort. On 
this assumption, she lacks the capac­
ity to suffer, even in the broad sense 
defined above. From this I conclude 
that she has no more interests than, 
to be blunt, a dead person. (If on 
the other hand, there is a chance that 
in the future she may again be 
78 
sentient, then she has generally the 
same interests as a sleeping person.) 
Frey considers the suggestion that 
Karen Quinlan has no interests to be 
"bizarre", but to face the matter can­-
didly, if you, the reader, as con­-
scious as you a re now, were forced to 
choose between death on a certain 
date or on that date bei ng rendered 
irreversibly comatose for an indefinite 
period to be followed immediately by 
death, would you consider it a mean­-
ingfu I choice? 
The capacity to suffer, defined to 
include mental and physical discom­-
fort, also furnishes a firmer footing 
for animals' interests than does the 
more limited capacity to feel pain. 
This is because much of the suffering 
of animals in factory fa rms and labo­-
ratories is mental as well as physical. 
In addition, the capacity to suffer 
takes in fetuses and the unconceived 
of species other than humans, who 
also have a future stake in our not 
excessively polluting theenvi ronment 
or exhausting the supply of natural 
resou rces. 
I have argued that a case may be 
made that the capacity to suffer is a 
necessary condition for having inter­-
ests. In fact, I have not made such 
a case, and, for two reasons, I have 
no interest in making one. It is evi­-
dent that I have not proven that the 
capacity to suffer is a necessary con­-
dition for having interests, since I 
have not attempted to show that sub­-
jects that can not suffer cannot have 
interests. Plants and inanimate 
objects presumably cannot suffer, and 
it may well be that they therefore 
cannot have interests, but if there is 
some basis other than the capacity to 
suffer upon which they can be shown 
to have interests, then the case for 
animals' interests would be unaffected. 
That is the fi rst reason why I have 
no interest in proving that the capac­-
ity to suffer is a prerequisite to hav-
E&:A 111/3 
ing interests. (Here, incidentally, we 
should distinguish between the two 
forms of having an interest exempli­-
fied in the sentences "Good health is 
in John's interest" and "John takes an 
interest in good health." Even plants 
and inanimate objects arguably can 
have interests in the former sense, 
but only people (generally), and per­-
haps an imals (generally), can have 
interests in the latter sense. Frey, 
on this point, seems to have a double 
standard. He denies that animals 
have interests in the sense of taking 
an interest, and therefore concludes 
that their interests are on a par with 
those of tractors. Yet he admits that 
Karen Quinlan cannot take an interest 
in anything, but clearly believes that 
she has more vital interests than do 
tractors. ) 
The second reason that I have no 
interest in attempting to prove that 
the capacity to suffer is a necessary 
condition for having interests is that 
to do so would not by itself prove 
that animals have interests. To do 
this I would have to prove that the 
capacity to suffer (or some other 
quality animals possess) is a sufficient 
condition for having interests. To 
prove this Frey says one must prove 
that pain is intrinsically evil, and 
challenges advocates of animals' inter­-
ests to do so. But this point was 
covered by Edward Johnson's com­-
ments on Frey's book. 
In conclusion, believe have 
shown that a strong case may be made 
that the capacity to suffer physical or 
mental harm in the· present or the 
futu re is a necessary condition for 
having interests, but that the more 
important question is whether it is a 
sufficient condition. 
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